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ABSTRACT 
 
The Self-Transcendent Existential Present: Empirically Examining the Behavioral 
Implications and Relationships between Mindfulness, Self-Construal, and Mortality Salience 
 
by 
 
Brianna Kathryn Morseth 
 
 
Contemplative traditions place considerable emphasis on using mindfulness to 
critically investigate the nebulous concept of “self.” In fact, insight into the true nature of self 
is widely regarded as a pivotal mechanism underlying the transformative effects of 
mindfulness practice. Despite this strong emphasis on understanding the “self” within the 
contemplative traditions from which mindfulness is derived, little research in psychology has 
explicitly examined the relationship between mindfulness and self-construal. Furthermore, 
while traditional mindfulness practices are understood to facilitate insight that dissolves the 
self-other boundary which in turn leads to behavioral manifestations of compassion, the 
psychological study of mindfulness has thus far largely neglected examining pro-social 
outcomes of mindfulness in realistic contexts, instead relying overwhelmingly on self-report 
measures or focusing on cognitive and clinical outcomes. Furthermore, the environmental 
implications of mindfulness have received hardly any attention in spite of the growing need 
for scalable solutions to worsening environmental conditions throughout the world. 
Meanwhile, social psychology has carefully investigated cultural and individual differences 
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in independent and interdependent self-construal and devised an experimental framework in 
which to examine pro-social behaviors, including willingness to help another in need as well 
as resource sharing.  
In the present work, the existing social psychological research on self-construal is 
contextualized with the existing research on mindfulness. Three studies are then outlined: 
Study 1 serves as a correlational study intended to establish whether there is any relationship 
between trait mindfulness and various measures of self-construal. It also introduces a new 
measure of self-construal, adapted from the Inclusion of Other in the Self Scale (IOS; Aron, 
Aron & Smollan, 1992) for greater flexibility in measuring the perceived relationship 
between self and the environment, community, and one’s own thoughts. Studies 2.a. and 2.b. 
are experimental manipulations examining the effects of a brief 10-minute mindfulness 
induction on subsequent pro-social (i.e., willingness to help) and pro-environmental (i.e., 
recycling) behaviors. Study 3 is another experimental manipulation drawing from research on 
terror management theory (TMT; Greenberg, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 1986) which 
suggests that mortality salience, or being reminded of the inevitability of one’s own 
impending demise, leads to self-esteem striving, cultural world-view defense, and most 
notably in-group favoritism and out-group discrimination. The results of these studies are 
examined in the context of the convergence of mindfulness and social psychology, opening 
up new avenues for research in this still young and emerging field of “contemplative science.” 
Keywords: mindfulness, meditation, self, self-construal, self-transcendence, pro-social, pro-
environmental, behavior, mortality salience, terror management theory, contemplative 
science  
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The Self-Transcendent Existential Present: Empirically Examining the Behavioral 
Implications and Relationships between Mindfulness, Self-Construal, and Mortality Salience 
Self is seemingly at the center of human experience. It is from selves that 
communities are built, it is between selves that social interaction takes place, and it is within 
the minds of selves that existential questions regarding the nature of the self and its place in 
the universe emerge. Social psychology deals extensively with the self in its mapping of 
various social orientations onto different modes of “self-construal,” defined as the degree to 
which elements of the social world (e.g., close relationships, contexts for behavior, or 
important group memberships) are included in one’s representation of the self (Markus & 
Kitayama, 1991; Shweder & Bourne, 1984; Triandis, 1989). However, long before the 
emergence of social psychology as a discipline, the nature of the self, its relationship to the 
rest of the world, and its very definition have been questions plaguing the minds of 
contemplatives and philosophers for millennia. Given the central role of self to all of human 
experience, it is no surprise that questions of what it means to be a “self” have featured 
prominently in religion, spirituality, meditation, and other means of introspection. Only 
recently, however, has mindfulness—a long-standing contemplative practice with Eastern 
religious origins, recently adapted to modern, Western, psychological, secular contexts—
interfaced with social psychology.  
Meditation has until roughly the last century existed as a religious practice confined 
to the contemplative traditions, including but not limited to Buddhism in Asia. Only within 
the past few decades has meditation been transformed into the secular practice of 
mindfulness and placed under the scrutinizing lens of Western science, a context in which it 
has adopted a variety of new meanings. Mindfulness is variously defined as a trait (entailing 
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the ability to remain focused on a chosen subset of stimuli), a state (of present-moment 
awareness), and a practice (involving attention-regulation in the face of mind-wandering). As 
a pioneer of the secular mindfulness movement and its interface with Western psychology, 
Jon Kabat-Zinn, in his explanation of Mindfulness-Based Stress Reduction (MBSR) as a 
clinical intervention, defines mindfulness as paying attention in a particular way: on purpose, 
in the present moment, and non-judgmentally (1990). In practicing mindfulness, one adopts 
an attitude of non-judgment towards the moment by moment unfolding of one’s experience 
(Bishop et al., 2004; Kabat-Zinn, 2003). Although mindfulness initially requires deliberate 
effort and exertion of control in the regulation of one’s fluctuating attentional states, it 
proceeds into an open receptivity and a relaxed effortlessness. This is reflected in 
phenomenological accounts of meditation. For instance, in meditation, one simultaneously 
experiences deep relaxation and increased internalized attention (Murata et al., 2004). For 
this reason, the existing research on mindfulness has primarily honed in on the effects of 
mindfulness practice in stress-reduction and attention-regulation. 
In recent years, mindfulness research has also examined the resting state activity of 
the default mode network (DMN). The DMN, consisting of cortical midline regions such as 
the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) and posterior cingulate cortex (PCC) which serve as its 
two major “hubs,” is deactivated during task performance and activated during periods of 
mind-wandering, otherwise understood to involve spontaneous fluctuations in attention and 
task-unrelated thought (Mason et al., 2007). Mindfulness meditation, the deliberate 
regulation of one’s attention, is one means of reducing self-referential processing (i.e., 
thoughts centered upon oneself) and the activity of the DMN (Brewer et al., 2011; Goldin, 
Ramel & Gross, 2009; Hasenkamp et al., 2012). Indeed, mindfulness meditation has revealed 
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two distinct neural modes of self-reference: 1) narrative focus, linked to self-referential 
cortical midline regions such as the mPFC, and 2) experiential focus, linked to reductions in 
mPFC activity (Farb et al., 2007). In the context of mood disorders, mindfulness has been 
shown to reduce evaluative processing supported by midline structures through the 
decoupling of the right insula and the mPFC, implying less conscious processing of 
somatosensory states (Farb et al., 2010). Mindfulness thus contributes to enhanced present 
moment awareness of unelaborated immediately experienced sensations, primarily through 
recognizing and disengaging from conceptual judgement. In other words, mindfulness can 
enable greater awareness of the immediate experience without added conceptualization and 
narrative construction, which tend to characterize ruminative self-referential processing.  
Due to its usefulness in reducing ruminative self-referential processing, mindfulness 
has been widely used among patient populations. Clinical applications of mindfulness have 
been particularly efficacious among patients dealing with chronic pain, stress, anxiety, and 
depression (Kabat-Zinn, 2003). A key reason for the use of mindfulness in the Mindfulness-
Based Cognitive Therapy (MBCT) program to address risk of depressive relapse stems from 
the relationship between mindfulness and activity of the DMN (which are negatively 
correlated) and the relationship between activity of the DMN and depression (which are 
positively correlated). In a clinical sample, depressed but not control subjects exhibited a 
failure to reduce activity of DMN regions while viewing negative affect pictures and 
reappraising them (Sheline et al., 2009). As a clinical intervention for depression, MBCT 
reduces ruminative self-referential processing and thereby activity of the DMN through the 
process of decentering, defined as experiencing thoughts and feelings as transient, 
impersonal, and not necessarily accurate (Teasdale et al., 2002). It enables patients to “know 
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the inner and outer landscape” by recognizing that their experience in the present moment is 
severely edited and often distorted through the routinized, habitual, and unexamined activity 
of thoughts and emotions (Kabat-Zinn, 2003). Filtering experiences through a narrative mode 
of self-reference tends to layer biases and assumptions upon the experiences themselves, a 
tendency that mindfulness challenges. 
While these outcomes are consistent with the intention behind mindfulness to 
question the nature of the self and one’s habitual patterns of thought, they are largely 
cognitive and relatively removed from the social world, in which self-other delineation is 
pervasive. Despite the long tradition of questioning the self in contemplative practices, 
including Buddhist meditation, and more recent cognitive neuroscience research on 
mindfulness and self-referential processing, very little has been investigated in the way of 
mindfulness and self-construal, a central construct in social psychology. Granted, in spite of 
its long history in the East, mindfulness has only been on the radar of social psychologists in 
the West for a few decades, providing little opportunity thus far for social psychological 
investigations of the relationship between dispositional mindfulness and self-construal, much 
less the effects of mindfulness practice on self-construal at a causal level. This work 
therefore aims to examine the overlap, both empirical and theoretical, between mindfulness 
and self-construal, laying the ground for future social psychological research on this 
emerging topic. 
Self, Itself: Construing and Constructing the Self 
In the psychological study of the self, especially within the sub-disciplines of social 
and cultural psychology, self-construal has emerged as a key concept with vast implications 
for human interaction. Simply put, self-construal refers to how an individual develops and 
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defines their relationship with the self, with others, and between the self and others (Kashima 
et al., 1995; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Singelis, 1994). Very broadly, self-construal also 
refers to what people believe about themselves, which takes a variety of forms and may be 
influenced by social factors and conditions ranging from culture to social expectations and 
norms (Shweder & Levine, 1984; Triandis, 1989). Given the diversity of selves in the world, 
the ways in which people construe themselves are arguably as myriad as there are people, 
though a handful of distinct categories of self-construal have been set forth. The two most 
widely researched of these are the independent and interdependent selves, often linked to 
culture. 
One possible reason for the lack of research on the relationship between mindfulness 
and self-construal may actually be cultural in origin, insofar as mindfulness has a much 
longer history in interdependent or collectivist cultures and has only recently been introduced 
to cultures that could be called independent or individualistic. Notably, individualism and 
collectivism, the conceptualization of the self as either an individual separate from context or 
as embedded within the collective, respectively (Triandis et al., 1988) are the constructs in 
widest use for explaining differences between cultural groups in self-construal. While 
collectivists define themselves as parts or aspects of a group, individualists focus on self-
concepts that are autonomous from groups (Singelis et al., 1995). Western cultures are 
thought to rely primarily on individualist self-construal while non-Western cultures rely on 
collectivist self-construal (Triandis, 1995). The gap in the mindfulness/self-construal 
literature is thus likely in part due to the individualistic orientation of the secular mindfulness 
movement versus the collectivistic orientation of monastic orders and other communal 
settings in which meditation was traditionally practiced. It should be noted, however, that this 
 6 
 
 
bifurcation of self-construal into individualist or collectivist cultural orientations does not 
imply that cultures are monolithic and homogenous. In other words, not all people of 
Western cultural background are individualists and not all people of non-Western cultural 
background are collectivists. Regardless, they have been found to be useful distinctions and 
as such will be treated dichotomously throughout the pages that follow despite the 
complexity that lies within each category, culture, and the selves that comprise them. 
From the original distinction between individualism and collectivism emerged the 
concepts of independent and interdependent selves, which also underlie the different cultural 
orientations toward mindfulness. These selves have been measured and defined in reference 
to the emphasis on connectedness and relationships (interdependent self-construal) more 
common among non-Western cultures, and to the separateness and uniqueness of the 
individual (independent self-construal) emphasized in the Western world (Singelis, 1994). 
An interdependent self-construal characterized by the fundamental relatedness of individuals 
to one another prevails in many Eastern cultures (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). This may 
explain why traditional meditation practices, which originate in collectivist cultures, 
emphasize self-transcendence or going beyond one’s own desires and concern for the ego, at 
least more-so than in the West where secular mindfulness has been used for individual 
purposes.  
In the Western secular mindfulness movement, expectations of personal benefits of 
mindfulness practice dominate over collective benefits, which is virtually unheard of in non-
Western cultures where the community is given greater importance than the individual. 
Indeed, there is a decreased tendency to view oneself as an independent agent among 
members of non-Western cultures (Kashima et al., 1995), where instead, people view 
 7 
 
 
themselves as members of various groups, clans, tribes, etc. (Triandis, 1995). This is 
contrasted with Western conceptions of the self, dominated by an independent self-construal 
in which individuals seek to maintain their individuality and independence from others by 
attending to the self and expressing their uniqueness (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). This mode 
of self-construal, and arguably worldview, involves praising, elevating, and asserting the 
self—after all, individualists are motivated by their own preferences, needs, and rights, 
giving priority to personal rather than to group goals—accounting for much of the 
competition observed in Western society (Triandis, 1995). The differences between 
independent and interdependent self-construal are especially relevant to the social 
psychological study of mindfulness and the consideration of new contexts for the 
development and propagation of mindfulness, which has traversed cultural boundaries in 
recent decades. 
Given that mindfulness originated in a non-Western cultural context, where it was 
practiced and adopted into the mindset and worldview of its host culture for over 2,500 years, 
its more recent introduction to the Western world provides an entirely different cultural 
context in which to investigate its psychological outcomes and correlates. For instance, in 
13
th
 century Japan, Zen master Dogen, a major proponent of meditation, is reported to have 
stated: 
"To study the Buddha Way is to study the self. To study the self is to forget the self. 
To forget the self is to be actualized by myriad things. When actualized by myriad 
things, your body and mind as well as the bodies and minds of others drop away. No 
trace of enlightenment remains, and this no-trace continues endlessly."  
― Dogen (trans. Tanahashi, 1995) 
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This type of self-transcendence requires a fundamental shift in self-construal, so that one no 
longer identifies as an individual "body and mind" and instead becomes "actualized by 
myriad things" in a collective sense, a perspective that is alien to the majority of Westerners.  
Notably, much of the existing research on mindfulness in the West has been from an 
individual gains perspective, without much focus on self-transcendence or the collective, 
societal, or group benefits derived from the practice. This may indeed be a result of the 
predominant mode of self-construal, that of individualism and independence, in Western 
culture, with which the majority of modern mindfulness researchers are inescapably affiliated. 
The Western view of the individual as an independent, self-contained, autonomous entity 
assumes something both socially and metaphysically at odds with Eastern conceptions of the 
self. To the Western mind, the individual comprises a unique configuration of internal 
attributes and behaves primarily as a consequence of these attributes (Sampson, 1989; 
Shweder & LeVine, 1984). On the other hand, the Eastern conception of self emphasizes 
harmonizing oneself with others in interdependence and gives little importance to unique 
internal attributes and the centrality of their motivating effects on behavior (Markus & 
Kitayama, 1991). Beyond these two modes of self-construal—the independent self, alone and 
disconnected from others, and the interdependent self, fundamentally connected to others and 
intimately interwoven into the fabric of society—lies the mindful self, which may be a form 
of self-construal that can be induced or primed.  
Mindfully Changing Selves: Priming Self-Construal 
Among Western psychologists and laypeople alike, it is commonly assumed that one 
remains more or less the same “self” throughout life, maintaining a core personality or 
essence that does not become radically altered, except for in the case of severe trauma (see 
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the case studies associated with Phineas Gage, Patient K.C., Patient H.M., etc.). For the most 
part, any given person is assumed to be the same person throughout their entire existence. 
One does not change selves as one would change clothes, as “self” is typically not seen as an 
outer layer that can be stripped off, but rather an inner core. Yet studies have shown that self-
construal can be primed, contributing to measurable shifts in both social and perceptual 
outcomes (Gardner, Gabriel & Lee, 1999; Haberstroh et al., 2002; Jiang et al., 2014; 
Oyserman & Lee, 2008; Sui & Han, 2007; Wang, Ma & Han, 2014). In these studies, people 
have been induced to adopt different views on their independence or interdependence on the 
basis of experimental influence, a finding that challenges the notion of an in-built, static and 
concrete self.  
However, the effectiveness of self-construal priming may still be modulated by 
culture. For instance, one may observe the same pattern of results by priming two cultures in 
different ways. In a study examining the distinct effects of self-construal priming on 
empathic neural responses in Chinese and Western participants, neural responses to stimuli 
depicting painful (vs. non-painful) situations were decreased by interdependent self-construal 
priming among Chinese but by independent self-construal priming among Westerners, 
suggesting that self-construal priming modulates sensitivity to perceived pain but that this 
effect varies with culture (Jiang et al., 2014). Thus, perhaps mindfulness can achieve the 
same outcomes among different cultures via different pathways, by either priming or 
inducing different self-construal processes. 
That different self-construals can be primed suggests a certain malleability of the self 
and social identity. As defined by Tajfel (2010), social identity is the part of an individual's 
self-concept that derives from 1.) their knowledge of social group membership and 2.) the 
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emotional significance and value ascribed to that membership. Relative to personal identities 
which take shape at the individual level, social identities are inherently contextual and 
dependent upon the collective (Brewer, 1991). Moreover, these identities are not mutually 
exclusive, but malleable, insofar as a person may shift between them. This would suggest 
that it is possible for the goal of mindfulness practice to shift depending on the context in 
which a practitioner engages with the practice. For instance, an obvious difference in social 
orientation and identity exists between a Westerner who practices mindfulness within the 
context of a group or tradition for purposes that transcend the self, versus one who does so 
for personal reasons, such as for stress relief within a medical context. In fact, the same 
individual may have begun to practice mindfulness for individual benefits yet later shifted to 
a more collectivist oriented practice. Such a shift in self-construal is supported by social 
identity theory, which takes into account the role of context.  
Although conditioned by one’s cultural upbringing, one can shift between selves—
perhaps not as radically as completely changing one’s entire identity, but nonetheless through 
momentary shifts in one’s perception of self in relationship to others. The ease with which 
this can be accomplished is startling. Many self-construal priming studies utilized simple 
verbal tasks—reading a story containing independent or interdependent themes and circling 
either individually-oriented pronouns (e.g., I, mine) or group-oriented pronouns (e.g., we, 
ours) in a paragraph of prose. For instance, subjects who were primed to view the self as 
independent endorsed individualist values and reported lower social obligations to others 
while subjects who were primed to view the self as interdependent endorsed collectivist 
values and reported higher social obligations to others (Gardner, Gabriel & Lee, 1999). 
Priming’s effectiveness indicates the ease with which self-construal can be shifted. The 
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implications for mindfulness are promising. Although no research to date demonstrates it, 
hypothetically, through mindfulness one could shift willfully between “selves.” 
“Solo Mindfulness” and the Independent Self  
 Independent self-construal refers to the perception of a bounded, unitary, stable self 
and emphasizes the separateness, internal attributes, and uniqueness of individuals (Markus 
& Kitayama, 1991; Singelis, 1994). Mindfulness might initially seem to complement this 
sense of independence, insofar as it is an inward-looking and thus intrapersonal (as opposed 
to interactive and interpersonal) practice. Indeed, there is every external indication that 
mindfulness is a solitary, quiet, and thus asocial exercise in self-monitoring. For instance, 
mindfulness practice fosters non-judgment of one’s internal experience and thus increases 
self-esteem, which for some may increase the sense of independence and self-mastery. Yet 
despite research associating independent self-construal with personal well-being and self-
esteem (Cross, Gore, & Morris, 2003; Elliott & Coker, 2008; Kwan, Bond & Singelis, 1997; 
Pilarska, 2014) and revealing correlations between mindfulness, well-being, and self-esteem 
(Brown & Ryan, 2003; Carmody & Baer, 2008; Shapiro et al., 2008), there have been no 
studies linking mindfulness directly to independent self-construal.  
However, some research may be interpreted to suggest that mindfulness increases 
perceptions of personal autonomy. For example, experimental manipulations demonstrate 
that mindfulness increases self-control (Bowlin & Baer, 2012; Friese, Messner & Schaffner, 
2012). Indeed, many studies document the personal benefits derived from mindfulness 
practice, including clinical outcomes such as decreases in stress, anxiety, and depression 
(Grossman et al., 2004; Kabat-Zinn, 2003; Shapiro et al., 2006) and cognitive outcomes such 
as increases in attention and executive control (Evans, Baer, & Segerstrom, 2009; Jha et al., 
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2007). These individual gains, ostensibly having little relation to social psychological 
outcomes, can be personally empowering to those who reap them, contributing to an 
enhanced sense of independence.  
Because mindfulness is stereotypically considered a solitary practice, it is possible 
that it is capable of priming an independent self-construal, which as a mediator or moderator 
may then account for additional psychological outcomes associated with mindfulness. 
Studies have indeed shown that priming self-construal contributes to measurable changes in 
observable psychological outcomes, suggesting that self-construal may be a mediator or 
moderator (Pilarska, 2014; Ma et al., 2013). For instance, experimentally, an independent-
self prime steers visual preferences towards “local” stimuli (Lin, Lin & Han, 2008). Similar 
findings extend to the neural level, where priming independent self-construal contributes to 
greater neural activity in the right middle frontal cortex when viewing one’s own rather than 
familiar faces (Sui & Han, 2007). Independence-primed participants are also more 
susceptible to greater redundancy in conversation, as measured by repetition when asked 
about closely related concepts (Haberstroh et al., 2002). Although no studies have explicitly 
tested this, the pattern of results resembles what one might expect in the case of mindfulness, 
which disengages from interaction with “others” and focuses instead on the localized, so-
called “self.” 
“Social Mindfulness” and the Interdependent Self 
 In contrast, interdependent self-construal refers to the perception of a flexible, 
variable self and emphasizes connectedness, social context, and relationships (Singelis, 1994). 
Among interdependent selves is found a pervasive attentiveness to relevant others in one’s 
social context, making one’s activities situationally-bound, thus resulting in a highly 
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contextualized self (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). This attentiveness is not unlike mindfulness, 
especially the newly conceptualized construct “social mindfulness,” which entails “focusing 
attention on the needs and interests of others in situations of interdependence” (Van Doesum 
et al., 2013).  
Indeed, the work from which social mindfulness as a concept derives is a classic 
cultural psychology experiment. When presented with a choice of pens in which one color 
was more common and the other color unique, East Asians (interdependent self-construal) 
were more likely to choose one of the several common pens while European-Americans 
(independent self-construal) chose the single unique pen (Kim & Markus, 1999). The Social 
Mindfulness (SoMi) paradigm adapted this experiment by using a unique item and common 
items in a task in which “you choose first, then the other person” (Van Doesum et al., 2013). 
People higher in social mindfulness are able to recognize the impact of their own actions 
upon others—namely that if they choose the unique item, they are essentially depriving the 
other person, who is left with two or more of the common item, of a choice in the matter. 
Although relatively new, surprisingly little attention is paid to the concept of social 
mindfulness, which is rife with potential connections to self-construal. 
In the above case, an independent self-construal (which emphasizes individual 
uniqueness; Markus & Kitayama, 1991) may be predicted to contribute to the selection of a 
unique item, and by implication, would be associated with lower social mindfulness. In 
contrast, an interdependent self-construal is more likely to be associated with higher social 
mindfulness, the ability to take into account others in situations of interdependence. Indeed, 
people with other-oriented mindsets left interdependent-others greater choice than people 
with self-oriented and/or unspecified mindsets (Van Doesum et al., 2013). In another study, 
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strong interdependent self-construals were correlated with increased susceptibility to 
embarrassment (Singelis & Sharkey, 1995). This corroborates the theory of the 
interdependent self-construal as a socially embedded self greatly influenced by context and 
aspiring toward harmonization with the collective (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). In other 
experimental contexts, an interdependent prime steers visual preferences towards “global” 
stimuli (Lin, Lin & Han, 2008). This finding also lends credence to the notion that an 
interdependent self-construal involves taking the “bigger picture” (whether global stimuli or 
social context) into consideration, thus adopting a more inclusive perspective.  
Although it has not been empirically tested, it is possible that the interdependent self-
construal disengages self-referential processing, which is also disengaged by mindfulness 
(Brewer et al., 2011). Disengaging from the tendency to associate with “I, me, and mine” 
characterizes mindfulness practice remarkably well, and in disengaging from this “self-ing,” 
one is said to transcend suffering. Yet whether this entails a shift to a “we-self” or “non-self” 
remains to be addressed in an empirical context.  
“Existential Mindfulness” and the Defense of Self  
A primary motivating factor for “self-ing,” or the tendency to construe the self 
through self-reference of various sorts, may be existential in nature. Terror Management 
Theory (TMT) suggests that a fundamental need for self-esteem drives all human behavior 
and counteracts the terror evoked by recognition of one’s own mortality (Greenberg, 
Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 1986). Constructing a self that one views favorably can thus be 
considered an existential defense mechanism and anxiety buffer. Indeed, self-enhancement 
has been called a universal human motive, traversing cultural lines (Sedikides, Gaertner, & 
Toguchi, 2003). Yet such cultural lines are often the basis for self-esteem defense, giving rise 
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to the tendency to differentiate between oneself and others, between one’s in-group and the 
out-group.  
Ernest Becker proposes that self-esteem and culture feature prominently in providing 
a sense of meaning, value, and security in a threatening, indeterminant universe in which 
only death is certain (1971, 1973). Confirming this relationship, research shows that threats 
to an individual’s cultural worldview, which is integral to personal identity and existential 
meaning, leads to self-esteem striving (Pyszczynski et al., 2004). Due to its emphasis on non-
judgmental acceptance and present-moment awareness, mindfulness may function as a means 
of reducing existential anxiety while challenging deeply held opinions about the self as a 
distinct entity, thereby reducing the need to employ self-defense mechanisms in response to 
threats to one’s own cultural worldview.  
Because “self” is often regarded, either consciously or unconsciously, as a central 
element of existence, activity in favor of self-preservation is thus understandably a common 
theme throughout the developmental lifespan. In fact, according to Yalom (1980), the desire 
for psychological “immortality” is the default response to existential anxiety. At the same 
time, Erikson’s eight stages of the lifecycle (1960) are characterized by existential questions 
and the conflicts they raise for the individual. Although forms of existential angst may exist 
early in the lifespan, self-preservation and ego integration in the later stages of development 
tend to become central to one’s activities as one approaches death. Yet regardless of one’s 
developmental stage or cultural orientation, ego-obsession, excessive focus on self-
preservation, and avoidance of the present by mentally projecting oneself into the past or 
future can become maladaptive to both one’s individual psychological well-being and one’s 
social functioning.  
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One approach to addressing these maladaptive states is through mindfulness, which 
also has an existential component. Spearheaded by Jon Kabat-Zinn (1990), mindfulness 
meditation has gained notoriety as a promising treatment for maladaptive self-reference by 
enabling the individual to remain present to the continuous unfolding of the immediate 
experience. Thus, mindfulness can perhaps dampen self-centeredness by decreasing the 
desire for psychological immortality and self-preservation in response to death anxiety and 
instead reorienting the mind to the present moment, training the individual to remain open, 
receptive, and equanimous to whatever arises, whether pleasant or unpleasant, 
nonjudgmentally—a perspective which has implications for experimental research combining 
mindfulness theory with existentialism and social psychology. 
Regardless of which stage of the lifecycle, to confront the inevitability of one’s own 
death causes immense dissonance in the mind of the individual and raises the crisis of 
meaninglessness, which “stems from the dilemma of a meaning-seeking creature who is 
thrown into a universe that has no meaning” (Yalom, 1980, p. 9). Upon recognizing one 
inhabits a world in which the only certainty is death, it may feel as if all meaning in life has 
been lost, leaving the individual with a sense of existential terror. According to Terror 
Management Theory (TMT), this existential terror results from the desire to live while being 
forced to acknowledge the reality of death (Greenberg, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 1986). 
Importantly, empirical research on TMT indicates that mortality salience, or bringing to mind 
thoughts of one’s own death, leads to self-esteem striving, which involves pursuit of positive 
self-evaluations as a means of buffering against the terror and anxiety evoked by the uniquely 
human awareness of mortality (Pyszczynski et al., 2004). The effect of self-esteem striving as 
a byproduct of mortality salience is so strong that it often leads to in-group favoritism and 
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out-group discrimination, as measured by positive ratings of individuals who uphold one’s 
cultural worldviews and negative ratings of those who violate them (Rosenblatt et al., 1989; 
Greenberg et al., 1990). Similarly, realistic group conflict theory proposes that opposing 
claims to scarce resources, whether power, wealth, or prestige, generate ethnocentrism and 
antagonism between groups while contributing to in-group favoritism and out-group 
discrimination (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). In this case, the existential uncertainty of access to 
resources, many of them social, is buffered by self-esteem inflation at the expense of others 
who are perceived to be different. These findings suggest that self-esteem striving in 
response to death anxiety—the experience of existential terror that can be encountered at any 
stage of the lifecycle— has negative social outcomes. 
The only published empirical research examining the relationship between 
mindfulness, social cognition, and mortality salience (combining the theories outlined thus 
far) yielded promising results supporting the theory that trait mindfulness may reduce the 
effects of mortality salience on out-group discrimination (Niemiec et al., 2010). Specifically, 
after a mortality salience prime in which subjects were asked to reflect on the thought of their 
own death, less mindful individuals showed higher worldview defense as well as higher self-
esteem striving. In other words, individuals who scored low in trait mindfulness were more 
likely to defend their own views as a means of self-preservation. The same study also found 
that higher trait mindfulness reduced racially defensive responses to mortality salience (i.e., 
higher mindfulness scores predicted decreased racial discrimination) and that participants 
lower in trait mindfulness made harsher judgments of social transgressions (i.e., lower 
mindfulness scores predicted harsher judgement of others) under mortality salience. Perhaps 
most relevant is that higher trait mindfulness predicted less suppression of death-related 
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thoughts immediately following mortality salience. This suggests that mindfulness, 
characterized by present moment awareness that does not avoid the reality of impermanence 
but instead confronts it without judgement, may be a viable solution to existential terror 
encountered at the various stages of the developmental lifecycle. 
The present research thus ambitiously aims to examine the purported relationship 
between mindfulness, self-construal, pro-social and pro-environmental behavior, and terror 
management theory. Study 1 employs a correlational design to investigation the relationship 
between trait mindfulness and various self-construal measures. It is hypothesized that trait 
mindfulness will be more-so correlated with interdependent self-construal (e.g., collectivism) 
than with independent self-construal (e.g., individualism). In study 1, a new measure of self-
construal is also introduced and piloted, namely the Inclusion of Other in the Self Scale – 
Revised (IOS-R), which uses a Venn-diagram model of overlapping circles to measure 
perceived connection between self and the environment, community, and thoughts. It is 
hypothesized that mindfulness will be associated with greater self-environment and self-
community overlap and less self-thoughts overlap due to the ability of the mindful person to 
decenter from thoughts, meaning thoughts are experienced as mental events rather than as the 
self (Teasdale et al., 2002). In studies 2.a. and 2.b., an experimental design is employed to 
examine the effects of mindfulness on pro-social and pro-environmental behavior. It is 
hypothesized that relative to a control group, the mindfulness induction will lead to greater 
self-environment and self-community overlap, less self-thoughts overlap, and higher rates of 
pro-social and pro-environmental behavior. In study 3, an experimental design is employed 
to examine the effects of a mortality salience prime (relative to a control prime) followed by 
a mindfulness induction (relative to a control task) on in-group favoritism and out-group 
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discrimination. It is hypothesized that the mindfulness induction will dampen the negative 
effects of the mortality salience prime, preventing in-group favoritism and out-group 
discrimination. These studies will be discussed in detail in the pages that follow. 
General Method 
In the studies reported here, all testing took place in the Psychology Building through 
the Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences at the University of California in Santa 
Barbara in individual testing rooms equipped with a desktop computer. All data were 
obtained through Qualtrics™ online survey software and analyzed using SPSS™. 
Study 1 Method 
Participants 
130 undergraduates (aged 17-25: M = 18.79, SD = 1.277, 89 Female) enrolled in 
Psych 1 and Psych 7 were recruited through the UCSB Sona Systems subject pool to 
participate in a half-hour study entitled “Drawing and Social Cognition.” Subjects received 
course credit for their participation.  
Procedure 
After indicating their consent upon arriving in the laboratory, subjects were asked to 
complete a drawing exercise. Each subject was presented with a packet of paper containing 
boxes in which to draw two circles representing the relationship between “self” and [the 
other category], adapted from the Inclusion of Other in the Self Scale (IOS; Aron, Aron & 
Smollan, 1992) but in continuous rather than discrete form and with size variation in self-
other circles permitted. The “other” category was exchanged for “community,” 
“environment,” and “thoughts,” yielding three pairs of circles. 
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Subjects were then assigned to an individual cubicle where they completed the 
following surveys via Qualtrics on one of the desktop computers provided: Mindful Attention 
Awareness Scale (MAAS; Brown & Ryan, 2003), Perceived Stress Scale (PSS; Cohen, 1983), 
Interpersonal Reactivity Index - Empathic Concern Subscale (IRI; Davis, 1980, 1983), 
Satisfaction With Life Scale (SWLS; Diener et al., 1985), Connectedness to Nature Scale 
(CNS; Mayer & Frantz, 2004), Self-Compassion Scale - Common Humanity and Isolation 
Subscales (SCS; Neff, 2003), Rosenberg Self Esteem Scale (RSES; Rosenberg, 1965), 
Generalized Self Efficacy Scale (GSES; Schwarzer & Jerusalem, 1995), and Individualism-
Collectivism Scale (ICS; Triandis & Gelfland, 1998). After completing the surveys, subjects 
were thanked and assigned credit for participating.  
Study 1 Results 
 All paper-based circle-drawings were measured by hand by research assistants using 
standard office rulers, with units reported in millimeters. Data were entered by each research 
assistant into a common Excel spreadsheet, where subsequent calculations were performed to 
obtain the percentage of overlap between the two circles (area of overlap relative to the 
combined area of the two circles) and a size ratio (area of “self” circle relative to area of 
“other” circle). These data were then combined with the data contained in the SPSS 
spreadsheet, where sums and averages for self-report measures were computed. Behavioral 
observations were tallied and entered as dichotomous variables, with 0 indicating a subject 
did not perform the behavior in question and 1 indicating a subject performed the behavior in 
question.   
Data from Study 1 were subject to correlational analysis. Bivariate correlation 
revealed noteworthy correlations among the following: self-thoughts overlap and satisfaction 
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with life (SWLS; R = .226, p = .01); self-community overlap and horizontal collectivism 
(ICS-HC; R = .149, p = .091), vertical collectivism (ICS-VC; R = .190, p = .031), 
collectivism (ICS-C; R = .242, p = .005), and common humanity (SCS-CH; R = .210, p 
= .016); self-environment overlap and connection to nature (CNS; R = .175, p = .046). 
Furthermore, trait mindfulness (MAAS) correlated negatively with vertical individualism 
(ICS-VI; R = -.175, p = .047) and positively with horizontal collectivism (ICS-HC; R = .180, 
p = .041). Trait mindfulness (MAAS) also correlated positively with common humanity 
(SCS-CH; R = .287, p < .001) and negatively with isolation (SCS-I; R = -.290, p < .001). 
Connection to nature (CNS) correlated with horizontal collectivism (ICS-HC; R = .373, p 
< .001), overall collectivism (ICS-C; R = .336, p < .001), and empathic concern (IRI-EC; R 
= .244, p < .005). Empathic concern (IRI-EC) was correlated with self-environment size ratio 
(R = .232, p = .008). 
Study 1 Discussion 
In Study 1, self-thoughts overlap was positively associated with satisfaction with life. 
This correlation was initially puzzling, as it was originally hypothesized that self-thoughts 
overlap would be negatively correlated with trait mindfulness and that trait mindfulness 
would be positively correlated with satisfaction with life. That satisfaction with life is 
associated with greater self-thoughts overlap is surprising, as it seems to suggest that life 
satisfaction is associated with identifying more with one’s thoughts. However, the affective 
valence of subjects’ thoughts, or the particular types of thoughts they identified with (as 
reflected by greater overlap) was never solicited, leaving the meaning and implications of 
greater self-thoughts overlap unclear. Future studies should aim to clearly define the types of 
thoughts in question by providing, for instance, a box for self-positive thoughts overlap and 
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another for self-negative thoughts overlap for the purpose of disambiguation, or alternatively, 
allow subjects to specify what types of thoughts they intend to depict in their drawings. An 
alternative explanation for the association between self-thoughts overlap and satisfaction 
with life is that greater self-thoughts overlap reflects a more equanimous and less resistant 
orientation to thoughts, which mindfulness promotes through its emphasis on non-judgement.  
Study 1 also revealed that self-community overlap is positively associated with 
horizontal collectivism, vertical collectivism, overall collectivism, and common humanity, 
lending support to the validity of the IOS-R in measuring the construct of closeness to the 
community in the forms of the collective and humanity. Study 1 further demonstrated that 
self-environment overlap is associated with connection to nature, another piece of support for 
the validity of the IOS-R in measuring the construct of closeness to the environment in the 
form of connection to nature. Both of these data points confirm that self-community and self-
environment overlap are understood by subjects to refer to closeness with one's community 
and one's environment, respectively, which is relatively straightforward and less ambiguous 
than self-thoughts overlap, which as discussed above, has no specific referent in its present 
form.  
Furthermore, trait mindfulness was negatively associated with vertical individualism 
and positively associated with horizontal collectivism. This suggests that there is perhaps a 
subtle social element to the tendency toward present moment awareness. It may be the case 
that horizontal collectivists (those who value egalitarianism and the group) are more aware of 
their immediate surroundings and even the effects of their own actions on the “others” 
(whether the community or the environment) around them. Trait mindfulness was also 
positively associated with common humanity and negatively associated with isolation, again 
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suggesting a social-connectedness component to bare attention, which is the aspect of 
mindfulness the MAAS emphasizes and captures.  
That connection to nature was positively associated with horizontal collectivism, 
overall collectivism, and empathic concern suggests that there is a relationship between 
environmental identification and community identification. That empathic concern was 
positively associated with self-environment size ratio so that more empathy was associated 
with more similarity between self and environment sizes further confirms this hypothesis. 
The data suggests that seeing oneself as more similar to the environment (i.e., in size) and 
seeing oneself merging with the environment (i.e., in overlap) reflects greater empathy for 
and connection to nature.  
Study 2.a. Method 
Participants 
Subjects included 54 UCSB undergraduates (aged 18-23: M = 18.96, SD = 1.183, 33 
Female) enrolled in Psych 1 and Psych 7 recruited through the UCSB Sona Systems subject 
pool to participate in a half-hour study entitled “Attention and Experiences.”  
Procedure 
Upon arriving in the laboratory, subjects were asked to provide their informed 
consent. Subjects were then randomly assigned to individual cubicles equipped with desktop 
computers to complete a set of surveys on Qualtrics. The first set of surveys included the 
Mindful Attention Awareness Scale (MAAS; Brown & Ryan, 2003), Connectedness to 
Nature Scale (CNS; Mayer & Frantz, 2004), and Interpersonal Reactivity Index - Empathic 
Concern Subscale (IRI; Davis, 1980, 1983. Subjects then reached a page on Qualtrics that 
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instructed them to pause and inform the researcher that they were ready for the next part of 
the experiment.  
Once all subjects had completed the first set of surveys, they were randomly assigned 
to one of two conditions: 1.) 10-minute mindfulness of breathing induction involving paying 
attention to the breath, or 2.) 10-minute reading task involving a filler article on human 
respiration. The instructions used in condition 1 were based on standard guided mindfulness 
practices included in Mindfulness-Based Stress Reduction (MBSR). The article used in 
condition 2 was excerpted from Wikipedia. Both conditions were framed as an “attention 
exercise” (paying attention to the breath in the context of mindfulness, paying attention to the 
text in the context of reading) in an effort to control for demand characteristics.  
After the 10-minute attention exercise, subjects were given a quarter sheet of paper 
with their subject ID number at the top and asked to either draw or write a brief (no more 
than 30 seconds) reflection on the “attention exercise” (mindfulness vs. reading). Before they 
began, they were told that the researcher would not be collecting the paper and that the 
reflection exercise was simply intended to get them to briefly reflect on the activity they just 
engaged in for the past 10 minutes. In actuality, the quarter sheet of paper was critical at the 
conclusion of the study, to be described in detail below.  
After the brief reflection exercise, subjects were then asked to complete a circle 
drawing exercise, in which they were presented with a packet of paper containing boxes in 
which to draw two circles representing the relationship between “self” and [“community,” 
“environment,” “thoughts”] modeled after the Inclusion of Other in the Self Scale (IOS; Aron, 
Aron & Smollan, 1992).  
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After completing the drawing exercise, subjects were then asked to continue where 
they left off with the surveys on Qualtrics in their individual cubicles. The second set of 
surveys included the Situational Self-Awareness Scale (SAAS; Govern & Marsch, 2001) and 
Toronto Mindfulness Scale (TMS; Lau et al., 2006).  
Measures of pro-environmental and pro-social behavior were recorded through 
observation. At the conclusion of the surveys, subjects were reminded that the reflection 
exercise was for their own benefit and that the quarter sheet of paper was not needed by the 
researcher. They were told they could “dispose of the piece of paper” on their way out of the 
lab. A clearly identifiable recycling bin (a blue plastic bin with white recycling logo 
containing several pages of white printer paper) was placed directly next to a trash can (a 
gray tin can lined with a black trash bag containing miscellaneous foodscraps and used 
tissues), both equidistant from the exit. Measures of pro-environmental behavior were 
derived from observations of whether subjects placed their quarter sheet of paper in the 
recycling bin vs. trash can. The experimenter’s research assistants retrieved these papers 
from their respective receptacle after all subjects left, and using the subject ID number at the 
top of each piece of paper, tallied whether subjects disposed of the paper in the recycling bin 
or trash can. Disposing of the paper in the recycling bin was classified as pro-environmental 
behavior. 
The morning after the day subjects completed the experiment in the lab, each subject 
was individually contacted via email (using the email addresses listed on the Department of 
Psychological & Brain Sciences UCSB Psychology Research Participation Sign-Up Sona 
Systems website) and told that due to a technical error in the lab, their data file was lost. 
They were informed that they still received credit for participating but that the loss of data 
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was an inconvenience to the researchers. They were then asked if they would be willing to 
come back to the lab, even though there would be no direct benefit to them, at a time of their 
own convenience to help the researcher by filling out the survey portion of the study again. 
An affirmative answer was classified as pro-social behavior. Subjects were debriefed by 
email only after completion of all experimental procedures. 
Study 2.a. Results 
Data from Study 2.a. were subject to independent t-test. Pre-induction, subjects 
randomly assigned to the mindfulness and control conditions did not differ in trait 
mindfulness (MAAS; t(52) = .783, p = .437), empathic concern (IRI-EC; t(52) = .814, p 
= .42), or connection to nature (CNS; t(52) = -1.668, p = .101). Furthermore, post-induction, 
conditions did not differ in self-awareness (SAAS; t(52) = .165, p = .870). However, post-
induction, subjects in the mindfulness condition scored significantly higher on state 
mindfulness than subjects in the control condition (TMS; t(52) = -2.133, p = .038).  
Moreover, at the behavioral level, subjects in the mindfulness condition were 
significantly more likely to recycle (t(52) = -2.096, p = .041), less likely to use the trash (t(52) 
= 3.053, p = .004), more likely to volunteer their time to return to the lab to help recover “lost 
data” a day later (t(52) = -2.180, p = .034). In the circle-drawing task, subjects in the 
mindfulness condition were significantly more inclusive in self-community overlap (t(52) = -
2.007, p = .05) but did not differ from control subjects in self-environment overlap (t(52) = -
.972, p = .335) or self-thoughts overlap (t(52) = -.870, p = .388). 
Study 2.a. Discussion 
In Study 2.a., subjects in the mindfulness condition were significantly more likely to 
recycle, less likely to use the trash, and more likely to volunteer their time to return to the lab 
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to help recover “lost data” even when asked a day after participating in the experiment. This 
seems to suggest the pro-environmental effects of even a 10 minute mindfulness practice are 
immediate and that the pro-social effects persist beyond the mindfulness session itself. Of 
course, the average amount of time such effects persist remains to be investigated. 
As there were no pre-induction differences between the mindfulness and control 
conditions in MAAS, IRI-EC, and CNS scores, it is unlikely that trait mindfulness or 
baseline empathic concern and connection to nature could account for the observed pro-
social and pro-environmental behaviors. Since there were also no post-induction differences 
between the mindfulness and control conditions in SAAS scores, it is unlikely that general 
self-awareness could account for the observed behavioral outcomes. However, that subjects 
in the mindfulness condition scored significantly higher on the TMS suggests a possible role 
for state mindfulness in accounting for the observed pro-social and pro-environmental 
behaviors.  
Post-induction, subjects in the mindfulness condition were significantly more 
inclusive in their depictions of self-community overlap but did not differ from control 
subjects in self-environment overlap or self-thoughts overlap. This suggests a possible role 
for self-community overlap as a mediating variable linking mindfulness and pro-social 
behavior.  
Study 2.b. Method 
Participants 
Subjects included 60 UCSB undergraduates (aged 18-22: M = 19.47, SD = 1.096, 31 
Female) enrolled in Psych 1 and Psych 7 recruited through the UCSB Sona Systems subject 
pool to participate in an hour-long study entitled “Attention and Experiences.”  
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Procedures 
After consenting to participate, subjects were assigned to individual cubicles 
equipped with desktop computers to complete a set of surveys on Qualtrics. The first set of 
surveys included the Mindful Attention Awareness Scale (MAAS; Brown & Ryan, 2003), 
Connectedness to Nature Scale (CNS; Mayer & Frantz, 2004), Santa Clara Brief Compassion 
Scale (SCBCS; Hwang, Plante, & Lackey, 2008), and Self Importance of Moral Identity 
Scale (SIMIS; Aquino, 2002). Subjects then reached a page on Qualtrics that instructed them 
to pause and inform the researcher that they were ready for the next part of the experiment.  
Once subjects completed the first set of surveys, they were assigned to one of three 
conditions: 1.) 10-minute mindfulness of breathing audio induction involving paying 
attention to the breath, 2.) 10-minute audio lecture on human respiration, or 3.) 10-minute 
positive mood induction through music. The instructions used in condition 1 were an audio 
recording by Jon Kabat-Zinn in a Mindfulness-Based Stress Reduction (MBSR) workshop. 
The lecture used in condition 2 was educator.com instructor Bryan Cardella’s piece on the 
physiology of the respiratory system. The music used in condition 3 was a freely-available 
looped version of Delibes’ “Coppelia,” previously shown to reliably induce positive mood 
(Sutherland et al., 1982; Matthews & Bradley, 1983; Teasdale & Spencer, 1984; Clark & 
Teasdale, 1985; Albersnagel, 1988; Mayer et al., 1990; Lenton & Martin, 1991; Parron, 1991; 
Parron & Sabini, 1991; Bouhuys et al., 1995; Willner et al., 1998; Clark et al., 2001). All 
three conditions were framed as an “attention exercise” (paying attention to the breath, 
paying attention to the lecture, paying attention to the music) in an effort to control for 
demand characteristics. The mode of presentation (audio) was also matched across conditions. 
 29 
 
 
The music condition was included specifically to test whether positive mood accounted for 
any of observed behavioral effects. 
After completing the “attention exercise,” subjects followed the same procedures as 
in Study 2.a., involving the brief reflection exercise using the quarter sheet of paper provided 
by the researcher followed by the circle drawing exercise modeled after the IOS.  
Subjects then completed a second set of surveys, which included the Situational Self-
Awareness Scale (SAAS; Govern & Marsch, 2001), Toronto Mindfulness Scale (TMS; Lau 
et al., 2006), Positive and Negative Affect Scale (PANAS; Watson, Clark & Tellegen, 1988), 
and Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale (Reynolds, 1982). Additionally, subjects 
were asked to reflect on why they drew their circles as they did and were provided with 
open-ended response space in which to type out their reflections and explain their thought-
process.  
After completing the surveys, the same observation-derived measures of pro-
environmental and pro-social behavior as in Study 2.a. were collected. Subjects were 
debriefed by email only after all experimental procedures had been completed. 
Study 2.b. Results 
Data from Study 2.b. were subject to one-way ANOVA. Pre-induction, groups did not 
differ in baseline compassion (SCBCS; F(2,57) = .276, p = .760), importance of moral 
identity (SIMIS; F(2,57) = 2.096, p = .132), connection to nature (CNS; F(2,57) = .429, p 
= .653) or trait mindfulness (MAAS; F(2,57) = .280, p = .757). Post-induction, groups 
differed significantly in self-environment size ratio (F(2,57) = 3.982, p = .024) and in self-
environment overlap (F(2,57) = 3.874, p = .026) but not in self-community ratio (F(2,57) 
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= .064, p = .938), self-community overlap (F(2,57) = 1.958, p = .151), self-thought ratio 
(F(2,57) = .059, p = .943), or self-thought overlap (F(2,57) = .141, p = .869). 
The type of induction had a significant effect on use of trash (F(2,57) = 4.181, p = .02) 
and recycling (F(2,57) = 4.101, p = .022) but not lost data (F(2,57) = 2.344, p = .105). 
Groups differed significantly in state mindfulness (TMS; F(2,57) = 4.295, p = .018) and 
positive mood (PANAS-P; F(2,57) = 2.587, p = .084) as a function of induction type but not 
in negative mood (PANAS-N; F(2,57) = .013, p = .987) or self-awareness (SSAS; F(2,57) = 
2.133, p = .128). The type of induction also affected enjoyment of the experiment (F(2,57) = 
3.501, p = .037). 
Post-hoc analyses revealed which conditions (henceforth: lecture, music, and 
mindfulness) differed significantly from others. Multiple comparisons using Tukey’s HSD 
showed that the difference between mindfulness and lecture for use of trash was marginally 
significant (p = .061) so that mindfulness subjects were less likely (M = .30, SE = .10513) 
and lecture subjects were more likely (M = .65, SE = .10942) to dispose of the quarter sheet 
of paper in the trash on their way out of the lab. The difference between mindfulness and 
music for use of trash was significant (p = .027) so that mindfulness subjects were 
significantly less likely and music subjects were significantly more likely (M = .70, SE 
= .10513) to dispose of the quarter sheet of paper in the trash on their way out of the lab. 
There was no significant difference between lecture and music for use of trash (p = .941).  
For use of recycling, there was a significant difference between mindfulness and 
lecture (p = .042) in which mindfulness subjects were significantly more likely to recycle (M 
= .55, SE = .11413) and lecture subjects were significantly less likely to recycle (M = .20, SE 
= .09177). There was also a significant difference between mindfulness and music (p = .042) 
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in which mindfulness subjects were significantly more likely to recycle and music subjects 
were significantly less likely to recycle (M = .20, SE = .09177). There was no significant 
difference in recycling between lecture and music for recycling (p = 1.00).  
For willingness to help, the difference between mindfulness and lecture was 
marginally significant (p = .089) so that mindfulness subjects were more likely (M = .30, SE 
= .10513) and lecture subjects were less likely (M = .05, SE = .05) to indicate a willingness to 
help recover “lost data.” There was no significant difference between mindfulness and music 
(p = .406) although numerically, mindfulness subjects were still slightly more likely than 
music subjects (M = .15, SE = .08192) to indicate a willingness to help. There was no 
significant difference between lecture and music in willingness to help (p = .667).  
For state mindfulness (TMS), the mindfulness condition differed significantly from 
music (p = .015) so that mindfulness subjects scored higher on state mindfulness (M = 3.51, 
SE = .10274) than subjects in the music condition (M = 2.9767, SE = .15637). The 
mindfulness condition did not differ significantly (p = .155) from lecture (M = 3.1633, SE 
= .12709). There was no significant difference in state mindfulness between music and 
lecture conditions (p = .573). 
For positive mood (PANAS-P), there was a marginally significant difference between 
the mindfulness and music conditions (p = .07) in which subjects in the music condition 
expressed more positive affect (M = 2.8, SE = .16607) than mindfulness subjects (M = 2.275, 
SE = .18805). There was no significant difference (p = .654) between mindfulness and 
lecture (M = 2.48, SE = .13506). There was also no significant difference (p = .36) between 
music and lecture in positive mood.  
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For enjoyment of the experiment, there was a significant difference between music 
and lecture (p = .036) in which participants in the music condition (M = 4.2, SE = .15560) 
reported enjoying the experiment significantly more than subjects in the lecture condition (M 
= 3.6, SE = .16859). There was no significant difference (p = .146) between music and 
mindfulness (M = 3.75, SE = .17584) despite music being rated as numerically higher in 
enjoyableness. There was also no significant difference (p = .801) between mindfulness and 
lecture conditions. 
For self-environment size ratio, there was a marginally significant difference between 
mindfulness and music conditions (p = .056) so that mindfulness subjects depicted 
themselves as more similar in size to the environment (M = .7067, SE = .08505) than music 
subjects (M = .3988, SE = .09619). Furthermore, there was a significant difference between 
mindfulness and lecture conditions (p = .038) so that mindfulness subjects depicted 
themselves as more similar in size to the environment than lecture subjects (M = .3777, SE 
= .09520). There was no significant difference between music and lecture conditions (p 
= .986). 
For self-environment overlap, there was no significant difference between 
mindfulness and music conditions (p = .136), even though mindfulness subjects depicted 
themselves as more overlapping with the environment (M = .4262, SE = .09585) than music 
subjects (M = .2174, SE = .07869). However, there was a significant difference between 
mindfulness and lecture conditions (p = .025) so that mindfulness subjects depicted 
themselves as more similar in size to the environment than lecture subjects (M = .1364, SE 
= .19675). There was no significant difference between music and lecture conditions (p 
= .733). 
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Study 2.b. Discussion 
Study 2.b. was a replication attempt of Study 2.a. that also introduced an additional 
condition (positive mood induction through music) to assess the possible role of mood in 
contributing to pro-social and pro-environmental behavior. If mood was the driving factor 
behind pro-social and pro-environmental behavior, the music condition (in which subjects 
reported the most positive affect and also reported enjoying the experiment the most) should 
have led to more recycling and volunteering, but it did not. Instead, the mindfulness 
condition led to significantly more recycling than either the lecture or music conditions. As 
the mindfulness condition also led to significantly higher state mindfulness and self-
environment overlap, it seems highly likely that state mindfulness and self-environment 
overlap may have influenced behavior. Self-construal, as reflected in self-environment 
overlap, may have mediated the relationship between mindfulness and pro-environmental 
behavior.  
In Study 2.b., the previously observed pro-social effect did not replicate, nor did self-
community overlap. This may in part be due to the length and timing of the study. Study 2.a. 
was a half-hour study while 2.b. was an hour long. Furthermore, study 2.a. took place near 
the beginning of the academic quarter, when students were relatively less busy, while study 
2.b. took place during the second half of the quarter (half way through the quarter until the 
end of the quarter), when students were likely occupied with midterms and final exams and 
thus less likely to have time to come back into the lab. Future replication attempts should 
make an effort to match the duration of the studies as well as their timing during the quarter 
in order to control for these possible influences on subjects’ willingness to volunteer their 
time to help.  
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Study 3 Method 
Participants 
A total of 92 undergraduates (aged 17-23: M = 18.88, SD = 1.201, 53 Female) 
enrolled in Psych 1 and Psych 7 were recruited through the UCSB Sona Systems subject pool 
to participate in a study entitled “Attitudes in Life: Personality and Reflection.” Subjects 
received course credit for their participation.  
Procedures 
After indicating their consent, subjects were asked to complete the Mindfulness 
Attention Awareness Scale (MAAS; Brown & Ryan, 2003), Neuroticism and Openness to 
Experiences sub-scales of the Big 5 Personality Inventory (John & Srivastava, 1999), the 
Self-Consciousness Scale-Revised (Scheier & Carver, 1985), and Reflection Scale (Trapnell 
& Campbell, 1999) as baseline individual differences measures. 
Subjects were randomly assigned to one of four conditions: 1) mortality salience 
prime followed by mindfulness induction, 2) mortality salience prime followed by lecture on 
the respiratory system, 3) dental pain prime followed by mindfulness induction, or 4) dental 
pain prime followed by lecture on the respiratory system.  
Upon completion of baseline measures, subjects were first either given a mortality 
salience prime or a dental pain prime. Following Greenberg et al. (1990), in the mortality 
salience condition, they were asked to “Please write about what you think will happen to you 
as you physically die,” and “Please write about the emotions that the thought of your own 
death arouse in you.” In the dental pain condition, they were asked to “Please write about the 
physical experience of dental pain,” and “Please write about the emotions that the thought of 
your own dental pain arouse in you.” 
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After the writing prime, subjects were randomly assigned to either a mindfulness 
condition or a control condition. In the mindfulness condition, they listened to a 10-minute 
guided mindfulness meditation delivered by Jon Kabat-Zinn, a Professor of Medicine who 
specializes in mindfulness and healthcare. In the control condition, they listened to a 10-
minute educator.com lecture on the human respiratory system delivered by Bryan Cardella, a 
Professor of Biology who specializes in anatomy and physiology. Both audio clips were 
matched in terms of their duration, breath-related content, and quality of delivery (as well as 
reputability of the speaker); the mindfulness audio differed in its focus on actually bringing 
attention to the breath through meditation practice, an experientially-oriented approach, while 
the lecture on respiration was cognitively-oriented and merely intellectual in its content. 
Next, subjects completed an additional set of questionnaires: the state version of the 
Mindfulness Attention Awareness Scale (MAAS-state; Brown & Ryan, 2003) and a mood 
measure used by Greenberg et al. (1990) in their mortality salience research (i.e., on a scale 
from 1-9, how happy, calm, irritated, secure, angry, disturbed, hostile, and frustrated are 
you?). Subjects also completed a digitized version of the IOS in which they were asked to 
use a sliding scale (anchored at 0% and 100%) to indicate how they currently felt in terms of 
connection between self and [environment, community, thoughts].  
Subjects were then introduced to the in-group/out-group rating task. In this task, they 
were presented with brief descriptions of two people who were introduced as if they were 
real but whose descriptions were in fact written by the experimenter and her research 
assistant: an in-group member (“Will,” a fellow UCSB student) or an out-group member 
(“Abioye,” member of the Bantu tribe of South Africa). The descriptions of the two people 
(Person A and Person B) were presented one after the other in counterbalanced order. 
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Subjects were then asked to rate each person on various criteria, as indicated by the 
Interpersonal Rating Scales used by Greenberg et al. (1990). In addition to interpersonal 
ratings, subjects were also asked how they would split a hypothetical $10 between self and 
other in two separate scenarios: 1) self and person A, and 2) self and person B 
(counterbalanced for order). After the in-group/out-group task, subjects were debriefed about 
the true nature of the in-group/out-group descriptions (namely, that they were written by the 
experimenter and her research assistant) and the purpose of the study. They were also asked 
to rate, on a scale of 1-7 (where 1 = not at all and 7 = extremely) how much they enjoyed the 
experiment. Subjects were compensated with course credit for their participation. 
Study 3 Results 
Data from Study 3 were subject to one-way ANOVA. In the pre-prime/pre-induction 
self-report measures, there was no significant difference between conditions in trait 
mindfulness (F(3,88) = .053, p = .984), openness to experience (F(3,88) = 1.189, p = .319), 
reflection (F(3,88) = .224, p = .880), self-consciousness (F(3,88) = .550, p = .650), positive 
mood (F(3,88) = 2.06, p = .111.) or negative mood (F(3,88) = .756, p = .522). However, 
there was a significant difference between conditions in neuroticism (F(3,88) = 3.346, p 
= .023). Post-hoc Tukey’s HSD revealed the only significant difference in neuroticism pre-
induction (p = .028) was between Mortality+Lecture (M = 3.2671, SD = .61113) and 
Pain+Mindfulness (M = 2.7329, SD = .63787) conditions. 
There was no significant difference between conditions in negative mood post-
induction (F(3,88) = 1.689, p = .175), but there was a significant difference between 
conditions in positive mood post-induction (F(3,88) = 6.706, p < .001). Post-hoc Tukey’s 
HSD revealed a significant difference in positive mood post-induction between 
 37 
 
 
Mortality+Mindfulness and Pain+Lecture conditions (p < .001), so that subjects in the 
Mortality+Mindfulness condition reported more positive affect (M = 7.3889, SD = 1.05256) 
and subjects in the Pain+Lecture condition reported less positive affect (M = 5.6515, SD = 
1.33523). There was also a significant difference in positive mood post-induction between 
Pain+Mindfulness and Pain+Lecture conditions (p = .014), so that subjects in the 
Pain+Mindfulness condition reported more positive affect (M = 6.9130, SD = 1.60874) and 
subjects in the Pain+Lecture condition reported less positive affect, as reported above. 
Post-prime/post-induction, there were no significant differences between conditions 
in trait index ratings of the in-group member (F(3,88) = 1.534, p = .211) yet there were 
significant differences between conditions in trait index ratings of the out-group member 
(F(3,88) = 3.117, p = .03). There were no significant differences in interpersonal judgement 
scale ratings of the in-group member (F(3,88) = 1.967, p = .125) and no significant 
differences in interpersonal judgement scale ratings of the out-group member (F(3,88) = 1.38, 
p = .254). There were significant differences between conditions in out-group sharing 
preference (F(3,88) = 3.856, p = .012) but not in-group sharing preference (F(3,88) = .839, p 
= .476). 
Post-hoc Tukey’s HSD showed that for trait index ratings of the out-group member, 
the Mortality+Mindfulness condition did not significantly differ from a.) Mortality+Lecture 
(p = .234), differed significantly from b.) Pain+Lecture (p = .017), and did not differ 
significantly from c.) Pain+Mindfulness (p = .343). Mortality+Mindfulness (M = 6.9229, SD 
= .74615) was not significantly different from a.) Mortality+Lecture (M = 6.3413, SD = 
1.24167), but was significantly different from b.) Pain+Lecture (M = 5.9909, SD = 1.12341), 
and was not significantly different from c.) Pain+Mindfulness (M = 6.4109, SD = 1.03). 
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There were no significant differences between Mortality+Lecture and Pain+Lecture (p 
= .677), Mortality+Lecture and Pain+Mindfulness (p = .996), or Pain+Mindfulness and 
Pain+Lecture (p = .537). 
For out-group sharing preference, the Mortality+Mindfulness condition differed 
significantly from a.) Mortality+Lecture (p = .008), was marginally different from b.) 
Pain+Lecture (p = .096), and did not differ significantly from c.) Pain+Mindfulness (p 
= .299). Sharing with the out-group by the Mortality+Mindfulness condition (M = .0833, SD 
= 4.47133) was significantly higher than a.) Mortality+Lecture (M = -4.1304, SD = 4.71269), 
marginally higher than b.) Pain+Lecture (M = -2.9545, SD = 4.16879) and was numerically 
higher but not significantly so relative to c.) Pain+Mindfulness (M = -2.1739, SD = 4.17408). 
There were no significant differences between Mortality+Lecture and Pain+Lecture (p 
= .806), Mortality+Lecture and Pain+Mindfulness (p = .435), or Pain+Mindfulness and 
Pain+Lecture (p = .933). 
There was no significant difference between conditions in self-environment overlap 
(F(3,88) = .706, p = .551) or in self-community overlap (F(3,88) = .401, p = .753). However, 
there was a significant difference between conditions in self-thoughts overlap (F(3,88) = 
4.729, p = .004). Post-hoc Tukey’s HSD revealed a significant difference in self-thoughts 
overlap between Mortality+Mindfulness and Pain+Lecture (p = .002) so that subjects in the 
Mortality+Mindfulness condition (M = 81.5833, SD = 17.22465) reported significantly more 
self-thoughts overlap than did subjects in the Pain+Lecture condition (M = 55.5455, SD = 
23.08107). The difference between Mortality+Mindfulness and Mortality+Lecture was 
trending toward significance (p = .120), with Mortality+Mindfulness greater than 
Mortality+Lecture (M = 65.9565, SD = 28.50754). There was also a marginally significant 
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difference (p = .091) between Mortality+Mindfulness and Pain+Mindfulness (M = 65.0870, 
SD = 25.48424) in which self-thoughts overlap in the Mortality+Mindfulness condition was 
greatest. 
Study 3 Discussion 
In Study 3, the only pre-prime/pre-induction self-report difference was in neuroticism 
scores, which indicated that subjects randomly assigned to the Mortality+Lecture condition 
just so happened to be more neurotic than subjects who were randomly assigned to the 
Pain+Mindfulness condition. This finding seemed to have no bearing on the other results. 
The only post-prime/post-induction self-report difference was in positive mood scores, which 
indicated that subjects in the Mortality+Mindfulness condition and Pain+Mindfulness 
reported the most positive affect, respectively, and were both significantly different from 
subjects in the Pain+Lecture condition, who reported the least positive affect. From these 
findings, it may be the case that positive mood influenced subsequent ratings and willingness 
to share with the out-group. However, the fact that of all the prime-induction combinations, 
the Mortality+Mindfulness condition elicited the greatest post-induction positive affect is 
unprecedented, especially given the negative affect associated with mortality salience. This 
suggests that even a 10 minute mindfulness induction may be enough to reverse the mood 
effects of a mortality salience prime, allowing subjects to, in a small way, come to terms with 
their own mortality, at least insofar as not being emotionally disturbed by the thought of their 
own death in the short-term.  
Although there were no significant differences between conditions in trait index 
ratings of the in-group member, there were significant differences in ratings of the out-group 
member. For both the in- and out-group member, there were no significant differences in 
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interpersonal judgement scale ratings. However, there were significant differences between 
conditions in out-group sharing preference although not in-group sharing preference.  
Post-hoc analyses demonstrated that for trait index ratings of the out-group, subjects 
in the Mortality+Mindfulness condition did not rate the out-group differently from 
Mortality+Lecture or from Pain+Mindfulness, but rated the out-group significantly more 
favorably than did subjects in the Pain+Lecture condition. There were no significant 
differences between Mortality+Lecture and Pain+Lecture, Mortality+Lecture and 
Pain+Mindfulness, or Pain+Mindfulness and Pain+Lecture in out-group trait index ratings. 
There were also significant differences in out-group sharing preference. Sharing with 
the out-group by the Mortality+Mindfulness condition was significantly higher than 
Mortality+Lecture, marginally higher than Pain+Lecture, and although not significantly, was 
still numerically higher than Pain+Mindfulness. There were no significant differences 
between Mortality+Lecture and Pain+Lecture, Mortality+Lecture and Pain+Mindfulness, or 
Pain+Mindfulness and Pain+Lecture in out-group sharing preference. 
In combination, the positive effects of the Mortality+Mindfulness prime-induction 
combination on out-group trait index ratings and out-group sharing preference suggests 
something unique about this combination of activities. Contemplating one’s own death, both 
physically and emotionally, is a visceral experience that typically evokes aversion and 
avoidance. Yet when this contemplation is followed immediately by the practice of 
mindfulness, involving bringing one’s attention to whatever experiences inhabit the present 
moment without judgement, subjects reported greater overlap between self and thoughts, 
suggesting not that they suppressed the earlier thoughts about their own mortality, but that 
they were perhaps able to confront their thoughts, even those concerning death, mindfully – 
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with a willingness to be present to them, whatever their content, in equanimity. They 
subsequently reported greater positive affect, more favorable out-group trait index ratings, 
and a greater willingness to share with the out-group member, suggesting a shift in their 
relation to their own feelings as well as the “other.” The combined shift in self-thoughts 
overlap and in positive mood post-mindfulness seemed to influence their subsequent 
perception of the out-group member, perhaps by allowing them to see through and (at least 
momentarily) transcend their aversions to negative thoughts and to people who they might 
otherwise perceive as different from themselves.   
General Discussion 
The combined results of studies 1-3 suggest a connection between mindfulness and 
self-construal that has until now received little to no attention in empirical research. As 
shown by study 1, dispositional mindfulness is associated with a more egalitarian and 
interdependent (i.e., horizontal-collectivist) self-construal as well as greater connection 
between one’s self, the environment, and one’s community. Studies 2.a. and 2.b. suggest a 
role for even brief mindfulness practice in increasing short-term, small-scale pro-social and 
pro-environmental behaviors. The results of study 3 suggest that mindfulness practice can 
reduce existential anxiety, decrease aversion to an out-group, and facilitate pro-social giving. 
Mindfulness may therefore allow individuals to better cope with the recognition of their own 
mortality. By maintaining one’s attention in the present moment with an attitude of non-
judgment, one becomes less reactive to and more accepting of one’s immediate experience 
and all it entails, regardless of its emotional valence (Shapiro et al., 2006). These data serve 
as a foundation for exploring other dimensions of self-construal in relationship to 
mindfulness. 
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Future Directions: “Self-Transcendent Mindfulness” and the Metapersonal Self 
 In order to explore other dimensions of self-construal and its relationship to 
mindfulness, it may be useful to further examine the theories set forth by existential 
psychology and transpersonal psychology. While the independent and interdependent self-
construals have gained traction in social psychology, more recently, metapersonal self-
construal has been set forth as an extension of the self-construal literature. Metapersonal self-
construal refers to the perception of the self as being deeply interconnected with all forms of 
life (DeCicco & Stroink, 2007; Stroink & DeCicco, 2011). Although similar to the 
interdependent self, the metapersonal self is differentiated by its inclusivity and scope. While 
the interdependent self is concerned about harmonious relationships with specific other 
human beings, the metapersonal self-construal involves the perception of the self as having a 
deep interconnection with all forms of life, nature, and even the cosmos (Arnocky, Stroink & 
DeCicco, 2007; Stroink & Decicco, 2011), thus forming an allo-inclusive identity (Leary et 
al., 2008). While the interdependent self is interpersonal, the metapersonal self could be 
considered transpersonal. Indeed, the metapersonal self has received little attention aside 
from among transpersonal psychologists, perhaps because it transcends the boundaries of 
ordinary understandings of selves, especially in a modern, Western scientific context. This, 
however, makes it especially relevant to the social psychology of mindfulness. 
The self-transcendence implied by metapersonal self-construal aligns it with the 
Buddhist notion of not-self, the understanding that there is no substantial self that is inherent 
to experience. In a more psychological context, Schultz and Zelezny (1999) suggest that self-
transcendence reflects the degree to which a person values goals and ideals that are not 
directly linked to self (e.g., honesty, fairness), while self-enhancement reflects how much a 
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person values goals and ideals that are directly linked with tangible rewards for self (e.g., 
success, ambition, wealth). Given the overlap between metapersonal self-construal—the 
perception of oneself as embedded within a global environment and at one with the cosmos 
(DeCicco & Stroink, 2007)—and metaphysical views of one’s place in the universe, there 
appears to be room for comparisons between this mode of self-construal and mindfulness. 
One could say the metapersonal self is reminiscent of mystical experiences reported among 
contemplatives from the various spiritual traditions of antiquity, of which secular 
mindfulness is a modern adaptation. Understandably then, the metapersonal self is generally 
associated with the belief systems held by religiocultural groups like Buddhism (Stroink & 
DeCicco, 2011). Indeed, Buddhist meditation has been shown to impact self-directedness, 
cooperativeness, and self-transcendence, representing the intrapersonal, interpersonal, and 
transpersonal levels of self-concept, respectively (Haimerl & Valentine, 2001). The 
transpersonal (metapersonal) aspect in particular is an essential part of Buddhist mindfulness 
practice. 
Metapersonal self-construal bears striking resemblance to many of the metaphysical 
teachings of the contemplative traditions, including Buddhism, whose subtle influence can be 
felt on mindfulness and the psychological study thereof. Such metaphysical teachings include 
the absence of ego, the dissolution of separation between self and other, connection with all 
beings and with nature, and in certain schools the intention to delay one’s personal liberation 
in order to help rid all beings of suffering out of compassion (Wallace & Wallace, 1997). 
Such transformation of the “self” in relation to the “other” via mindfulness and meditation is 
not only anecdotally reported, but also supported by emerging experimental data. For 
example, trait mindfulness is related to the metapersonal self-construal but not the 
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independent or interdependent selves (Mara, DeCicco & Stroink, 2010; Stroink & Dupuis, 
2007). These findings represent the only documented associations between mindfulness and 
an explicit self-construal measure. 
This self-transcendent state may be the result of the unique mechanisms by which 
mindfulness works. Such mechanisms include the development of meta-awareness, 
perspective taking abilities, cognitive reappraisal, and self-inquiry, which may be used to 
target states of maladaptive self-schema and cognitive reification (Dahl, Lutz & Davidson, 
2015). Metacognitive awareness in particular is a pivotal feature of mindfulness that is 
arguably responsible for transforming the sense of self. In a clinical context, metacognitive 
awareness is a cognitive set in which negative thoughts and feelings are experienced as 
mental events rather than as the self (Teasdale et al., 2002). In non-clinical contexts, this may 
more broadly involve the ability to transcend the tendency to identify strongly as an 
individual self. It is therefore plausible that metapersonal self-construal may be related 
somehow to meta-awareness, the ability to take explicit note of the current contents of one’s 
consciousness and challenge their validity. Mindfulness increases meta-awareness and may 
thus lead to self-transcendence via the noticing of one’s fluctuating states of consciousness, 
which are seen to be devoid of a “self” that is separate and disconnected from the “other.”  
The implications of the metapersonal self-construal and the realization self-
transcendence via mindfulness are particularly noteworthy. Metapersonal self-construal 
uniquely predicts biospheric environmental concern, ecological cooperation, and self-reports 
of environmental conservation behavior (Arnocky, Stroink & DeCicco, 2007), 
understandable given its emphasis on connectedness to nature. Correlations exist between 
incorporation of nature into one’s identity and well-being (Howell et al., 2011; Zelenski & 
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Nisbet, 2012), suggesting the importance of the metapersonal self-construal to planetary 
well-being. Research also suggests connections between planetary and personal well-being in 
terms of relationships among environmentally responsible behavior and formal meditation 
practice (Jacob, Jovic & Brinkerhoff, 2009). These relationships open up the possibility of 
finding further connections between mindfulness, self-construal and environmentally 
conscientious behavior, which the present research begins to examine. 
 Future studies should explicitly explore the potential mediating role of self-construal 
in the relationship between mindfulness and pro-social and pro-environmental behavior. 
Such studies would also benefit from including a measure of metapersonal self-construal, 
which has validated associations with pro-environmental behavior and reflects greater 
connection to abstract collectives, such as the universe as a whole. Given the rapid 
advancement of mindfulness research, there is great potential for the integration of theories 
from cultural psychology, existential psychology, and transpersonal psychology into 
empirical investigations of mindfulness, both in the lab and in the field.  
Conclusion 
The present research begins to fill the conspicuous gap in the psychological study of 
mindfulness by shedding light on the practical social and environmental correlations and 
effects of mindfulness in ecologically viable contexts. The studies contained therein are 
among the first to introduce self-construal into the mindfulness literature and to propose an 
empirical examination of self-transcendent or “selfless” behaviors in connection with brief 
mindfulness practice. Further examination of the broader implications of self-transcendence, 
beyond the small-scale and short-term variations explored in the present research, is needed. 
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Furthermore, the present research contributes important empirical data to the until 
now unexamined effects of mindfulness practice as a potential buffer against the typically 
adverse effects of mortality salience, thus serving as a foundation for future research further 
examining the implications of the “existential present,” the ability to be mindful of both life 
and death with a sense of equanimity. That each of us inhabits a world fully known only to 
ourselves, in addition to the fact that our world will disappear at the time of death, typically 
creates anxiety (Yalom 2008, p. 121-122). Yet instead of becoming overwhelmed by terror at 
the thought of one’s own mortality and isolation, through mindfulness an individual may gain 
acceptance and equanimity around death as well as a sense of common humanity and 
recognition of shared mortality, truly internalizing that they are not alone in their 
predicament and that all lives must come to an end, potentially closing the gap between “self” 
and the “other.”  
Further research is needed to flesh out these theories on the relationship between 
mindfulness and existentialism. Yet the present data nonetheless lends support to the efficacy 
of mindfulness in practice and the importance of further experimental investigations of 
mindfulness both across the developmental lifespan and across cultures, ideally integrating 
perspectives from developmental psychology, cultural psychology, mindfulness practice, and 
existential theory in order to better understand the aspects of mindfulness that hold the best 
outcomes for individuals and the communities in which they are inextricably embedded. 
With further research in this area, the future of mindfulness studies in collaboration with 
social psychology stands to add significantly to the self-construal literature, both theoretically 
and practically.  
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In conclusion, the mindful “self” may in fact transcend all construal, being a selfless 
“self” (i.e., not a self) that needs no narrative embellishment, instead remaining perfectly still 
and without the obscurations of conceptual proliferation. As one of the first “psychologists” 
to explore the subject of “self” and its construal, the Buddha is reported to have said:  
“He has been stilled where the currents of construing do not flow. And when 
the currents of construing do not flow, he is said to be a sage at peace.' Thus 
was it said. With reference to what was it said? 'I am' is a construing. 'I am 
this' is a construing. 'I shall be' is a construing. 'I shall not be'... […] By going 
beyond all construing, he is said to be a sage at peace.” 
 
— Buddha, Dhatu-vibhanga 
Sutta: An Analysis of the 
Properties (MN 140, trans. 
Thanissaro Bhikkhu, 1997) 
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Appendix 
 
Figure 1. The Inclusion of the Other in the Self Scale – Revised (IOS-R). Featured here are 
four examples of possible depictions of self and other circles. The IOS-R presents a more 
flexible mode of depicting self and other by serving as a continuous measure of inclusivity 
and by allowing for size variation. 
 
Figure 2. Correlation between self-thoughts overlap and satisfaction with life. Bivariate 
correlation analysis revealed a significant positive relationship between self-thoughts overlap 
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and satisfaction with life. Participants reporting greater overlap between self and thoughts 
also indicated greater satisfaction with life. 
 
Figure 3. Correlations between self-community overlap, collectivism, and common humanity. 
Bivariate correlation analysis revealed significant positive correlations between self-
community overlap and collectivism, more-so with vertical collectivism than with horizontal 
collectivism. Common humanity was also positively correlated with self-community overlap 
as well as all dimensions of collectivism. 
 
Figure 4. Correlations between self-environment overlap and connection to nature. Bivariate 
correlation analysis revealed a significant positive correlation between self-environment 
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overlap and connection to nature. Participants who reported greater overlap between self and 
the environment also indicated greater connection to nature. 
 
Figure 5. Frequency of pro-environmental and pro-social behaviors (Study 2.a.). Mindfulness 
and control conditions differed in all measures of pro-environmental and pro-social behavior: 
mindfulness subjects were significantly less likely to dispose of paper in the trash, more 
likely to recycle, and more likely to indicate a willingness to help recover “lost data.”  
* indicates that results were significant at the p < .05 level.  
** indicates that results were significant at the p < .01 level.
 
 51 
 
 
Figure 6. Frequency of pro-environmental and pro-social behaviors (Study 2.b.). 
Mindfulness subjects exhibited the most pro-environmental behaviors. Mindfulness subjects 
were lower in trash use and higher in recycling than music subjects. Mindfulness subjects 
were marginally lower in trash use and significantly higher in recycling than lecture subjects. 
There were no significant differences in pro-social helping behavior.  
* indicates that results were significant at the p < .05 level.  
 
Figure 7. Favorable trait ratings of out-group. Subjects receiving the mortality prime and 
mindfulness induction rated out-group members significantly more favorably than subjects 
receiving the pain prime and lecture induction. There were no significant differences between 
any other conditions. 
* indicates that results were significant at the p < .05 level. 
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Figure 8. Preference for out-group sharing. Subjects receiving the mortality prime and 
mindfulness induction showed a significantly higher preference for out-group sharing than 
subjects receiving the mortality prime and lecture induction. A score of 0 indicates a 
preference for evenly splitting the $10 during the money redistribution task. Negative scores 
indicate a preference toward keeping the money to oneself. Positive scores indicate a 
preference for giving the money to the out-group member.  
** indicates that results were significant at the p < .01 level. 
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